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Abstract: Searchable encryption enables the data owner to outsource their data to
the cloud server while retaining the search ability. Recently, some researchers proposed
a variant of searchable encryption, named single-writer/multi-reader searchable encryption (SMSE), in which any authorized data user can perform a search query. That
is, each document identifier is encrypted using attribute-based encryption (ABE), such
that an arbitrary authorized user whose attributes match the corresponding access
policy can access the document. However, the cloud server cannot determine whether
the user has the ability to decrypt the matched data. Thus, it has to response all the
search results to the data user, which causes a heavy communication and computation
cost. To cope with this problem, we present a novel SMSE scheme based on server-side
match technique, where the cloud can filter the documents that cannot be decrypted by
the user and only return the matched ones. In addition, the decryption is also efficient,
independent with the access policy structure. Security and efficiency evaluation show
that our proposed scheme can achieve the desired security goals, while dramatically
reducing the communication and computation overhead.
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Introduction

Cloud computing provides on-demand computing resources over the internet
on a pay-for-use basis. One of the most attractive benefits is for the resourceconstrained users to outsource their data to the cloud server [Chen et al. 2015a,
Chen et al. 2016, Li et al. 2019, Xue et al. 2019, Yu et al. 2017]. In this way, the
users can enjoy the unlimited resources while reducing the maintenance cost
locally. However, outsourcing data to the remote server brings some security
challenges [Chen et al. 2014, Chen et al. 2015b], because the cloud server is curious about the users’ data and tries to mining useful information. As a result,
protecting the security of users’ sensitive data is a critical demand in the outsourcing service. Using traditional encryption technique to encrypt data before
outsourcing can protect the data security. However, it brings difficulties to perform some meaningful operations on the encrypted data, especially to search for
some content interested [Yu et al. 2018A].
Fortunately, searchable encryption (SE) was proposed to protect the security
of data while preserving the search ability over the encrypted data. Specifically, in SE scheme, the data owner first generates a search index and encrypts
the documents, and then outsources them to the cloud server. Later, if the
data owner wants to search some documents which contain a particular keyword, a search token is generated and submitted to the cloud server. Using
the search token, the cloud server performs a search over the search index
and finally returns the corresponding documents. For single keyword search,
the search token is only for a single keyword such that all the final searched
documents include the single queried keyword [Curtmola et al. 2006, Song 2000,
Stefanov et al. 2014, Wang et al. 2015, Wang et al. 2017]. To rich the query expression, conjunctive searchable encryption was proposed [Ballard et al. 2005,
Cash et al. 2013, Zuo et al. 2016], in which the final matched documents contain
all the queried keywords. However, all these works focus on single-writer/singlereader searchable encryption (SSSE). That is, the data owner outsources the
search index and documents, later it only allows the data owner itself to perform a search.
To extend SSSE to support data sharing, recently single-writer/multi-reader
searchable encryption (SMSE) [Sun et al. 2016] was proposed. For SMSE, an
authorized user is allowed to submit a legal search token and retrieve the corresponding documents. However, the challenge is how to allocate different permissions to the different authorized users. The permission contains two aspects,
the search permission and the decryption permission. For the search permission, the data owner predefines a keyword set for each user, and an authorized
user can generate a legal search token for the keywords in the predefines keyword set. For the decryption permission, an authorized user just can decrypt
the search results which are delegated to him/her. This goal can be achieved by
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encrypting the document identifiers based on attribute-based encryption (ABE)
[Bethencourt et al. 2007]. However, it suffers from unnecessary communication
overhead. The reason is that the server cannot determine whether the user can
decrypt a particular ciphertext. Thus all the search results have to be returned to
the user, including the ones which cannot be decrypted. This problem is severe
when there are a large number of matched search results, but only a fraction
can be decrypted. Besides, before performing decryption, the user has to test
whether his/her attributes meet the decryption requirement of each ciphertext.
As a result, it also brings the unnecessary computation overhead.
A trivial way to solve this problem is to send the user’s attributes to the
server. Then the server uses the attributes to match with the access policy and
determine whether the user can decrypt the ciphertext. However, the attributes
always contain the user’s personal sensitive information, which should be protected well. Besides, the traditional ABE technique also leaks the access policy to
the server. For the sake of protecting the access policy, anonymous ABE was proposed [Nishide et al. 2008]. However, it is very inefficient to perform decryption
for the user. Recently, Zhang et al. [Zhang et al. 2017] proposed a match-thendecrypt technique to improve the decryption efficiency. The idea is for the user
to perform match operation first to test whether s/he can decrypt the ciphertext. If yes, the user performs decryption. It indeed reduces a significant amount
of computationally intensive operations, such as pairings. However, the match
operation is performed on the user side. That means all the matched ciphertext
still have to be transformed to the user including the ones which cannot be decrypted. Besides, the match operation also needs to consume the energy of the
user’s device. As far as the authors’ knowledge, how to simultaneously reduce the
unnecessary communication and decryption overhead in SMSE without leaking
the access policy and user’s attributes remains unsolved.
1.1

Our Contribution

In this paper, we proposed a new SMSE scheme, in which the server has an
ability to test whether a ciphertext can be decrypted by the user. Thus the
server just needs to transmit the ones which can be decrypted by the user. In
this way, both the transmission and decryption cost are saved. Specifically, our
contributions are two folds:
• We first proposed a server-side match technique for anonymous ABE. We
design a particular component of ciphertext to test whether the access policy
in it matches with the user’s attributes. This match operation neither leaks
the access policy in the ciphertext nor the user’s attributes. Moreover, the
decryption on the user side is very efficient. It just needs a constant number
of pairing, which does not increase with the number of user’s attributes.
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• We then proposed a new SMSE scheme based on the server-side match technique. To achieve fine-grained access control, the document identifiers are
encrypted with the proposed anonymous ABE. On receiving the search token, the server first finds out all the search results. Instead of immediately
returning all of them to the user, the server uses the match technique to
test whether they can be decrypted by the user. Finally, the server just returns the ones which can be decrypted by the user. In this way, both the
communication and decryption overhead are dramatically reduced.
This is an extension of the conference version [Wang et al. 2017]. The main
differences between this two versions are as follows: First, we add the related
work in section 1.2, give the system model and design goals in section 3. Second,
to make the scheme clearer, a high description of our proposed SMSE scheme
is given in section 4.1. Third, we give more detailed proofs for the two lemmas
in section 5.1. Finally, we provide thorough experimental results to evaluate the
performance of our proposed scheme and compare it with the related work.
1.2

Related Work

Song et al. [Song 2000] proposed the first SE scheme, in which each keyword is
encrypted based on a particular two-layer encryption structure. To perform a
search query, it needs to scan the entire ciphertext sequentially. Goh [Goh 2003]
improved the search efficiency by constructing an index for each document using Bloom Filter, which can quickly test whether an element in a set. However, the search complexity is linear in the number of documents. Besides, the
Bloom Filter will bring false probability. The first sublinear scheme was proposed by Curtmola et al. [Curtmola et al. 2006]. In their scheme, the index is
constructed based on the keyword set in the database (inverted index) other than each document. Subsequently, Kamara et al. [Kamara et al. 2012] extended Curtmola et al. scheme to support document update. Some other works [Stefanov et al. 2014, Kim et al. 2017, Bost et al. 2017, Song et al. 2018] also
focus on dynamic property. However, all these works are single keyword search
scheme.
More complex conjunctive keyword search was first proposed by Golle et al.
[Golle et al. 2004]. Golle et al. gave two schemes for conjunctive keyword search.
The trapdoor size in the first scheme is linear in the number of documents, while
it is constant in the second one. However, the search index and search time are
all linear in the number of documents. Some other works [Ballard et al. 2005,
Ryu and Takagi 2007] are committed to improving the communication and storage efficiency. All these conjunctive keyword search schemes need a keyword
field, which is not practical in some applications. Wang et al. [Wang et al. 2008]
gave the first keyword field free conjunctive keyword search scheme. Later, Cash
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et al. [Cash et al. 2013] proposed the first sublinear conjunctive keyword search
using inverted index, which can also be extended to Boolean query. The idea
is first to search the least frequent keyword and then match the search results
with other queried keywords. Jarecki et al. [Jarecki et al. 2013] extended this to
the SMSE setting, however, it requires an interaction between the user and the
data owner for each query. Recently, Sun et al. [Sun et al. 2016] solved the interaction problem based on RSA assumption. In their scheme, the user can just
decrypt the ciphertext which is delegated to him/her, because the identifiers are
encrypted by ABE [Bethencourt et al. 2007].
ABE is a positive way to achieve fine-grained access control in data sharing
system. Key-policy ABE (KP-ABE) [Goyal et al. 2006] and ciphertext-policy
ABE (CP-ABE) [Bethencourt et al. 2007] are two kinds of ABE. They have different ways of encrypting a message. For KP-ABE, the ciphertext is related to
a set of attributes and a user’s private key is related to an access policy. While
in CP-ABE, the ciphertext is associated with an access policy and a user’s private key is associated with a set of attributes. Only when the user’s attributes
are satisfied with the access policy in the ciphertext, it can be decrypted by
the user. CP-ABE is more practical in access control system because the data
owner can encrypt a message under an access policy and share the ciphertext with different users. Since the first CP-ABE was proposed, plenty of works
[Chase 2007, Yu et al. 2018, Li et al. 2014, Li et al. 2018, Yu et al. 2019] have
been done to make improvement on it.
However, in these CP-ABE schemes, the access policy has to be sent along
with the ciphertext, and a user needs to combine their attributes with the access
policy to obtain the decryption key. To protect user’s attribute privacy, anonymous ABE schemes [Kapadia et al. 2007, Lai et al. 2011] have been proposed.
Although the attribute privacy is protected in these anonymous ABE schemes,
they also suffer from a severe drawback of decryption efficiency. Zhang et al.
[Zhang et al. 2017] proposed a match-then-decrypt anonymous ABE which improves the decryption efficiency. In this scheme, instead of directly decrypting a
ciphertext, a match phase is performed on the user side to test whether the user
can decrypt it.
1.3

Organization

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Some necessary preliminaries are
given in Section 2. The system architecture of our scheme is in Section 3. The
proposed server-side match technique and the new SMSE scheme are described
detailedly in Section 4. Next, we analyze the security of our scheme and compare
it with the existing scheme in Section 5. Finally, the conclusions will be made in
Section 6.
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Preliminaries
Bilinear Pairings

Suppose G and GT are two cyclic multiplicative groups with prime order p. Let
g be a generator of G. A bilinear pairing is a mapping e : G × G → GT with the
following properties:
1. Bilinear: e(g1a , g2b ) = e(g1 , g2 )ab for all g1 , g2 ∈ G and a, b ∈ Zp .
2. Non-degenerate: e(g, g) 6= 1.
3. Computable: It is efficient to compute e(g1 , g2 ) for all g1 , g2 ∈ G.
2.2

Intractable Assumption

In this section, we first define some intractable assumptions in the cyclic multiplicative group G and then we define the strong RSA assumption.
Definition 1. The Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption holds in G if
for any probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithm A there exists a negligible
function negl(·) such that
|Pr[A(g, g a , g b , g ab ) = 1] − Pr[A(g, g a , g b , g c ) = 1]| = negl(n),
where g is randomly selected from G, a, b, c are randomly selected from Zp and
n is the security parameter.
Definition 2. The Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) assumption holds in G if for any PPT algorithm A there exists a negligible function negl(·) such
that
|Pr[A(g, g a , g b , g c , e(g, g)abc ) = 1] − Pr[A(g, g a , g b , g c , g z ) = 1]| = negl(n),
where g is randomly selected from G, a, b, c, z are randomly selected from Zp
and n is the security parameter.
Definition 3. The Decision Linear (D-Linear) assumption holds in G if for any
PPT algorithm A there exists a negligible function negl(·) such that
|Pr[A(g, g z1 , g z2 , g z1 z3 , g z2 z4 , g z3 +z4 = 1] − Pr[A(g, g z1 , g z2 , g z1 z3 , g z2 z4 , g z ) = 1]|
= negl(n),
where g is randomly selected from G, z1 , z2 , z3 , z4 , z are randomly selected from
Zp and n is the security parameter.
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Definition 4 Strong RSA assumption. Let p′ and q ′ are primes and p and
q are strong primes satisfied p = 2p′ + 1 and q = 2q ′ + 1. The strong RSA
assumption holds if any PPT algorithm A there exists a negligible function
negl(·) such that
|Pr[A(n, g) = (z, e)]| = negl(·),
which satisfies z e = g mod n, where n = pq and g is a random element in Z∗n .
2.3

Anonymous ABE

Fine-grained access control in multi-user setting can be achieved by anonymous
ABE. For each ciphertext, there is an access policy in it. For each user, s/he is
allocated with a secret key according to her/his own attributes. If and only if the
user’s attributes satisfy the access policy, the user can decrypt the ciphertext
with her/his secret key. In our proposed anonymous ABE, the server has an
extra property that it can test whether a ciphertext can be decrypted by a user.
This test will neither leak the access policy nor a user’s attributes. The proposed
anonymous ABE has four algorithms:
• smABE.Setup(κ): This setup algorithm takes as input the security parameter κ and outputs the public key pk and master key mk.
• smABE.KeyGen(L, pk, mk): This key generation algorithm takes as input
the user’s attribute set L, public key pk, and master key mk. It outputs the
user’s secret key skL . The secret key includes two parts, skmat and skdec .
skmat is used for matching and skdec is used for decrypting.
• smABE.Enc(M, m, P ): This encryption algorithm takes as input a message
M , an auxiliary information m for M and access policy P . It outputs the
ciphertext e for M . In our scheme, every message M is associated with
an information m. The ciphertext e can be decrypted by the user whose
attribute set L satisfies the access policy P .
• smABE.Match(e, mt, D∆,0 ): This match algorithm is to test whether a
particular user can decrypt the ciphertext e. It inputs the ciphertext e,
auxiliary information mt and D∆,0 associated with user’s secret key. If the
ciphertext matches with the user’s attribute set, it outputs the ciphertext
edec for decrypting. Otherwise, it outputs “no”.
• smABE.Dec(edec , skdec ): This decryption algorithm takes as input the ciphertext edec and user’s decryption key skdec . It outputs the corresponding
message M .
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3

System Architecture

3.1

System Model

Our SMSE scheme supporting fast decryption consists of three entities: the data
owner, the cloud server and the user. The data owner has a plaintext database
and wants to outsource it to the cloud server. The data owner first encrypts
the database and generates a search index, then outsources them to the server.
Besides, the data owner allocates different privileges for searching and decrypting
to every authorized user. When a user wants to search for some documents, she
should generate a valid search token and submit it to the server. Upon receiving
the search token, the server performs a search over the search index and finds out
the corresponding search results. After that, the server tests each search result
to determine whether the user can decrypt. Finally, the server just returns the
search results which can be decrypted. In our system, we assume the server is
“honest-but-curious”, which means the server will follow our protocol and return
the correct search results, but try to learn as much information as possible from
the protocol. Figure 1 shows the system model. Formally, our scheme consists of
five algorithms:
• SMSE.Setup(λ, DB, K, U): Takes as input the security parameter λ, the
plaintext database DB, a list of decryption key array K and universe attribute set U , this setup algorithm outputs the system master key MK,
public key PK, the encrypted search index TSet and XSet. Finally the TSet
and XSet are outsourced to the server.
• SMSE.KGen(MK, L, w): Takes as input the system master key MK, user’s
attribute set L and a query keyword set w, this key generation algorithm
outputs the user’s private key sk. Finally, sk and w are together sent to the
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user. The user can just generate the search tokens for the keywords in the
set w.
• SMSE.TGen(sk, Q): Takes as input the private key sk and query Q, this
token generation algorithm outputs the search token st for the query Q.
• SMSE.Search(st, TSet, XSet): Takes as input the search token st, the search
index TSet and XSet, the server firstly searches over the index TSet and
XSet, finds out the corresponding search results R, then determines whether
the user can decrypt the results, finally returns the ones in S that the user
can decrypt.
• SMSE.Retrieve(sk, R): Takes as input the private key sk and the final
search results in S from the server, the user first decrypts the ciphertexts in
S and gets the document identifiers and document keys kid , then retrieves
the corresponding documents and decrypts them by kid .
3.2

Design Goals

This work aims to achieve multi-user searchable encryption supporting fast decryption. Based on the “honest-but-curious” server model, the design goals of
our scheme are as follows:
• Data Confidentiality. It is required that an adversary cannot learn the
data owner’s original data from the outsourced data stored on the cloud
server. In addition, the adversary cannot learn the queried keywords from
the search token.
• Attribute Privacy. The cloud server can neither learn the access policy in
the ciphertext, nor the user’s attributes.
• Fast Decryption. The cloud server can test whether a user can decrypt a
particular ciphertext with the help of the search token. But this test should
only work among the search results for the search token rather than the
whole ciphertext on the cloud server. After receiving the matched searched
results, the user should decrypt them efficiently.
3.3

Security Definition

The security of our proposed scheme is defined by a leakage function L, which
is learned by an adversary during the interaction with the proposed scheme.
The security demonstrates that the proposed scheme leaks nothing rather than
the leakage function. Specifically, an adversary has an negligible probability to
distinguish whether it is in a real experiment RealΠ
A (λ) or in an ideal experiment
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IdealΠ
A,S (λ). The ideal experiment is simulated by a simulator S based on the
leakage function. We describe the two experiments as follows:
RealΠ
A (λ): The adversary A chooses a database DB, and then the experiment
runs the setup algorithm (PK, MK, TSet, XSet) ← SMSE.Setup(λ, DB, K, U),
and the adversary is given (PK, TSet, XSet). Later, A selects an authorized keyword set w and gets the corresponding secret key. Next, A repeatedly and adaptively chooses a query Q, and the experiment runs the token generation and
search algorithms. Following, the experiment gives A the transcript (the search
token and the search results for the query) and the corresponding document
identifiers. Finally, A returns a bit as the experiment output.
IdealΠ
A,S (λ): The adversary A chooses a database DB. Then the experiment
gives the (PK, TSet, XSet) to the adversary using the simulator S, (PK, TSet,
XSet) ← S(L(DB)). Later, A repeatedly and adaptively chooses a query Q.
With the query, the experiment outputs the transcript and the corresponding
document identifiers by S(L(DB, Q), where Q represents all the previous queries
and the latest query. Finally, A returns a bit as the experiment output.
Definition 5. Our proposed scheme Π is L-semantically secure against adaptive attacks if for all PPT adversaries A there is a simulator S such that
Π
|Pr[RealΠ
A (λ) = 1] − Pr[IdealA,S (λ) = 1]| ≤ negl(λ).

4
4.1

SMSE Scheme with Fast Decryption
High Description

In this paper, we propose a new SMSE scheme supporting Boolean queries and
fast decryption, which saves both the communication and decryption overhead.
First, we propose a server-side match technique for anonymous ABE. This technique enables the server to test whether a particular ciphertext can be decrypted
by a user. To achieve this goal, we introduce special components in the ciphertext (C∆ , Cx , Ĉ0 , Ci,t,∆ ). Under the help of mt and D∆,0 which contain the
information of the user’s attributes, the server can determine whether the user’s
attributes meet the access policy hidden in the ciphertext. Note that this match
technique neither leaks the access policy nor the user’s attributes. Second, we
use our new anonymous ABE to encrypt the document identifiers instead of the
traditional ABE scheme. In this way, the server can use the match technique
to return the ones which can be decrypted by the user, rather than the entire
search results. As a result, both the communication and decryption overhead are
reduced.
4.2

Server-side Match Technique for Anonymous ABE

In this section, we present our server-side match technique for anonymous ABE
(smABE).
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• smABE.Setup(κ): We denote two cyclic multiplicative groups of prime
order p as G and GT , and a bilinear map e as G × G → GT . We also assume
the system attribute set is U = {τ1 , τ2 , ..., τn } and each attribute has multiple
values, where τi = {νi,1 , νi,2 , ..., νi,ni }. The data owner randomly chooses
R

R

g1 , g 2 ←
− G and y ←
− Zp , then computes Y ← e(g1 , g2 )y . The system public
key is pk = hg1 , g2 , Y i and the system master key is mk = hyi.
• smABE.KeyGen(L, pk, mk): This algorithm generates the attribute secrete key skL for a certain user whose attribute set is L = {L1 , L2 , ..., Ln }.
H is a hash function: {0, 1}∗ → G. First, the data owner randomly chooses
r, λ, λ̂ from Zp and computes D∆,0 ← g1r , Dx ← g2r , D0 ← g2λ , D̂0 ← g1λ̂ . AsQn
sume Li = νi,ki , the data owner also computes D̂∆,0 ← g2y i=1 H(i||νi,ki )r ,
Qn
Qn
D1 ← g1y i=1 H(0||i||νi,ki )λ and D̂1 ← g2y i=1 H(1||i||νi,ki )λ̂ . Then the
attribute secrete key is skL = hskmat , skdec i, where skmat = hD∆,0 , D̂∆,0 ,
Dx i and skdec = {D0 , D̂0 , D1 , D̂1 }.
• smABE.Enc(M, m, P ): The data owner encrypts a message M ∈ GT under the policy of P = {P1 , P2 , ..., Pn }. In our scheme, every massage M
is related to an auxiliary information m ∈ Zp . The data owner first genR

′

erates s, s′ , s′′ ←
− Zp , and then computes C̃ ← M Y s ; C∆ ← Y s ; Ĉ0 ←
′′
′
s′′
s′
g1 ; C1 ← g2 ; Ĉ1 ← g1s−s ; Cx ← g2s m . Then the data owner choosQn
Qn
R
es {σ , σ , σ ←
− G|1 ≤ i ≤ n} such that i=1 σi,∆ = i=1 σi,0 =
Qn i,∆ i,0 i,1
i=1 σi,1 = 1G and computes [Ci,t,∆ , Ci,t,0 , Ĉi,t,0 ] as follows:
R

1. If vi,t ∈
/ Pi , [Ci,t,∆ , Ci,t,0 , Ĉi,t,0 ] ←
− G.
2. If vi,t ∈ Pi , [Ci,t,∆ , Ci,t,0 , Ĉi,t,0 ] ←
′
′′
′′
[σi,∆ H(i||νi,t )s , σi,0 H(0||i||νi,t )s , σi,1 H(1||i||νi,t )s−s ].
Finally, the ciphertext of M is
e = hC∆ , Cx , Ĉ0 , C̃, C1 , Ĉ1 , {{Ci,t,∆ , Ci,t,0 , Ĉi,t,0 }1≤t≤ni }1≤i≤n i.
• smABE.Match(e, mt, D∆,0 ): The server performs this algorithm to test
whether a certain user can decrypt the ciphertext e. Here mt and D∆,0 are
given by the user, where mt = D̂∆,0 · Dxm . This algorithm outputs “yes” if
e(D∆,0 , Cx

n
Y

Ci,t,∆ )C∆ = e(Ĉ0 , mt).

i=1

According to Ci,t,∆ , the server finds all the corresponding Ci,t,0 and Ĉi,t,0 ,
Qn
Qn
then computes C ← i=1 Ci,t,0 , Ĉ ← i=1 Ĉi,t,0 . Finally, the server sends
edec = hC̃, C1 , Ĉ1 , C, Ĉi to the user.
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• smABE.Dec(edec , skdec ): The user performs this algorithm to decrypt the
ciphertext and gets the M .
M←

4.3

C̃e(C, D0 )e(D̂0 , Ĉ)
e(D1 , C1 )e(Ĉ1 , D̂1 )

.

Our Construction

In this section, we present our SMSE scheme with fast decryption. We denote the
Sd
whole keyword set as W = i=1 Widi , where Widi represents the keyword set for
document di ; the data owner’s database as DB = (idi , Widi )di=1 ; the identifiers
set containing keyword w as DB[w] = {id : w ∈ Wid }; the decryption key set as
K which is used to decrypt the original documents. And we let λ be the security
parameter. The details of the proposed scheme are given as follows.
• SMSE.Setup(λ, DB, K, U): This algorithm is run by the data owner. Firstly,
it chooses two big primes p, q, and computes N = pq. It denotes two pseudorandom functions F : {0, 1}λ × {0, 1}λ → {0, 1}λ , Fp : {0, 1}λ × {0, 1}λ → Z∗p
and selects random keys KI , KZ , KX for the Fp and KS for the F . Let
H: {0, 1}∗ → Zp be a hash function. The data owner randomly chooses
R

R

g←
− G and g̃1 , g̃2 , g̃3 ←
− Z∗N . Then it outputs the system master key MK =
hp, q, KS , KI , KZ , KX , g̃1 , g̃2 , g̃3 i and system public key PK = hN, gi. The
search index TSet and XSet are generated as in Algorithm 1 and finally
they are sent to the server.
• SMSE.KGen(MK, L, w): This algorithm is run by the data owner. Suppose
that an authorized user with attribute set L can search over keyword set w =
{w1 , w2 , ..., wn }, where the appearance frequency of the keywords satisfies
|w1 | < |w2 | < · · · < |wn |. The attribute private key is computed as skL =
smABE.KeyGen(L, pk, mk) = hskmat , skdec i for a user whose attribute
set is L = {L1 , L2 , ..., Ln }. For search keyword set w, the search private key
(1)
(2)
(3)
skw = {skw , skw , skw } is computed as:
1/

i
= (g̃i
skw

Qn

j=1

wj

mod N ), i = {1, 2, 3}.

Finally, the user’s private key sk = {KS , KZ , KX , skw , skL } and w are all
sent to the user.
• SMSE.TGen(sk, Q): This algorithm is run by the authorized user. Suppose
that an authorized user wants to perform conjunctive keyword search for
′
w̄ = {w1′ , w2′ , · · · , wm
}, where m ≤ n and w1′ is the least frequency keyword
among the queried keywords. Then the search token st is generated as follows
and finally it is sent to the server.
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Algorithm 1 Search Index (TSet, XSet) Generated Algorithm
Input: MK, PK, DB, K
Output: TSet, XSet
1: TSet, XSet ← φ
2: for w ∈ W do
1/w
1/w
3:
stagw ← F (KS , g̃1
mod N ); m ← H(g̃1
mod N ); c ← 1
4:
5:

for id ∈ DB[w] do
1/w
xind ← Fp (KI , id); z ← Fp (KZ , g̃2
mod N ||c); l ← F (stagw , c)

6:

y ← xind · z −1 ;

7:

e ← smABE.Enc((id||kid ), m, P )

8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:

TSet[l] = (e, y)
1/w
xtagw ← g Fp (KX ,g̃3
c←c+1
end for
end for
return TSet, XSet

(1)

- stag ← F (KS , (skw )

mod N )·xind

Q

′
w∈w\w1

w

; XSet ← XSet ∪ {xtagw }

1/w1′

mod N ) = F (KS , g̃1

mod N )

- For c = 1, 2, · · · until the server say stop
1. For i = 2, ..., m
(2)

xt[c, i] ← g Fp (KZ ,(skw
=g

1/w′
Fp (KZ ,g̃2 1

Q

)

′
w∈w\w1

mod

w

Q

(3)
mod N ||c)·Fp (KX ,(skw
)

1/w′
N ||c)·Fp (KX ,g̃3 i

mod N )

w∈w\w′
i

w

mod N )

;

2. Set xt[c] = xt[c, 2], · · · , xt[c, m];
′
1/w1

H(g̃1

- mt ← D̂∆,0 · Dx

mod N )

;

- set st = (mt, D∆,0 , stag, xt[1], xt[2], · · · ).
• SMSE.Search(st, TSet, XSet). This algorithm is run by the server which
consists of two steps: Search Step and Match Step. The details are shown in
Algorithm 2.
- Search Step: The server first finds out all the encrypted identifiers which
are satisfied with the search token. Specifically, The server uses stag
to find out the encrypted identifiers containing w1′ , and then justifies
′
). Finally,
whether they contain the other queried keywords (w2′ , · · · , wm
this step outputs the encrypted identifiers which contain all the queried
keywords.
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- Match Step: The server then uses mt and D∆,0 to test whether the
user can decrypt the encrypted identifiers generated in the Search Step.
Finally, this Match Step outputs the ultimate encrypted identifiers which
can be decrypted by the user.
• SMSE.Retrieve(sk, R). This algorithm is run by the user. On input the
private key sk and the search result R, this algorithm outputs the identifiers and the corresponding document keys. Finally the user retrieves the
documents and decrypts them.
- For each ê ∈ R, parse ê = hedec i and the user directly decrypts the
ciphertext
(id k kid ) ← smABE.Dec(edec , skdec ).
- For each id, the user sends it to the server and then gets the corresponding encrypted document. Finally the encrypted document can be
decrypted by kid .

Algorithm 2 SMSE.Search(st, TSet, XSet)
Input: st, TSet, XSet
Output: R
1: S, R ← φ
2: Parse st = (mt, D∆,0 , stag, xt[1], xt[2], · · · )
3: c = 1; l ← F (stag, c)
4: while TSet[l] exist do
5:

(e, y) ← TSet[l]

6:
if xt[c, i]y ∈ XSet for all i then
7:
S ← S ∪ {e}
8:
end if
9:
c ← c + 1; l ← F (stag, c)
10: end while
11: for e ∈ S do
12:

if smABE.Match(e, mt, D∆,0 ) = “yes” then

13:
set ê ← hedec i; R ← R ∪ {ê}
14:
end if
15: end for
16: return R
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Analysis of Our Proposed Scheme

5.1

Security Analysis

We first describe the security model for our smABE scheme using the following
game. A scheme is defined as IND-sCP-CPA security if no PPT adversary can
break this game with a non-negligible advantage.
Init: The adversary A submits two challenge access policies P0 and P1 .
Setup: The challenger C runs the smABE.Setup algorithm and gives the public
key P K to the A.
Phase 1: A submits an attribute list L to the C. C runs smABE.KeyGen and
returns the secret key skL , if (L |= P0 ∧ L |= P1 ) or (L 2 P0 ∧ L 2 P1 ). A can repeat
this quary polynomial times.
Challenge: A submits two messages M0 and M1 to the C. If any attribute list
satisfies both P0 and P1 , it is required that M0 = M1 . C randomly chooses a bit
v ∈ 0, 1, computes ePv = smABE.Enc(Mv , m, Pv ) and sends ePv to A.
Phase 2: Repeat the Phase 1. A cannot submit L which satisfies
L |= P0 ∧ L |= P1 , if M0 6= M1 .
Guess: A outs a guess v ′ of v. The advantage of A in this game is defined as
AdvIND−sCP−ABE
= |Pr[v ′ = v] − 21 |
smABE
Fig.1. The IND-sCP-CPA game

Theorem 6. Our smABE scheme is IND-sCP-CPA secure under the DBDH
assumption and D-linear assumption. The advantage ǫCPA for a PPT adversary
to attack the IND-sCP-CPA game in the random oracle model is negligible.
Proof. A sequence of hybrid games are used to prove that A cannot win the
original game G with non-negligible probability. It is supposed that the two
challenge access policies P0 = [P0,1 , P0,2 , · · · , P0,n ] and P1 = [P1,1 , P1,2 , · · · , P1,n ]
are submitted at the beginning of the game. We first modify game G to game G0 .
In game G0 , if A obtains the secret attribute key skL when (L 2 P0 ∧L 2 P1 ), the
ciphertext component C̃ is randomly chosen in GT and the rest components are
generated as usual. If A obtains the secret attribute key skL when (L |= P0 ∧L |=
P1 ), all components for the ciphertext are generated like in game G. In this case,
G0 = G1 . Then we change the components {{Ci,t,∆ , Ci,t,0 , Ĉi,t,0 }1≤t≤ni }1≤i≤n
and define a sequence of other games as follows.
For every attribute value νi,t in the universe attribute set, if (νi,t ∈ P0,i ∧
νi,t ∈ P1,i ) or (νi,t ∈
/ P0,i ∧ νi,t ∈
/ P1,i ), the components {Ci,t,∆ , Ci,t,0 , Ĉi,t,0 } in
all games are generated in normal way like in game G. If there exists a νi,t such
that (νi,t ∈ P0,i ∧ νi,t ∈
/ P1,i ) or (νi,t ∈
/ P0,i ∧ νi,t ∈ P1,i ), the ciphertext components {Ci,t,∆ , Ci,t,0 , Ĉi,t,0 } generated normally in game Gl−1 will be replaced
in game Gl by a random element in group G. We stop this replace process when
there is no such νi,t satisfies (νi,t ∈ P0,i ∧ νi,t ∈
/ P1,i ) or (νi,t ∈
/ P0,i ∧ νi,t ∈ P1,i ).
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In the last game, the advantage of A is zero because the distribution of the ciphertext components are the same no matter what the random bit ν is. The
above games are denoted as {G, G0 , G1 , · · · , Glmax }. Then we denote the probability for A to win the original game G as Pr[ε] and the probability to win the
game Gl is denoted as Pr[εl ]. Then the advantage in game G0 can be represented
as ǫCPA , where ǫCPA = |Pr[ε] − 21 | = |Pr[ε] − Pr[εlmax ]|, which has the following
property.
lX
max
ǫCPA ≤ | Pr[ε] − Pr[ε0 ] | +
| Pr[εl−1 ] − Pr[εl ] |.
l=1

We can prove that ǫCPA is negligible under the assumption of DBDH and
D-linear. From the Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, the inequalities | Pr[ε] − Pr[ε0 ] | ≤
ǫDBDH and | Pr[εl−1 ] − Pr[εl ] | ≤ ǫDL are hold. Here the ǫDBDH and ǫDL represent the advantage for a distinguisher to win the DBDH challenge and D-linear
challenge. Thus the inequality ǫCPA ≤ ǫDBDH + |U|ǫDL holds, where |U| represents the number of attributes in the system. Under the DBDH and D-linear
assumptions, ǫDBDH and ǫDL are negligible and thus ǫCPA is negligible. So we
conclude that our proposed scheme smABE is IND-sCP-CPA secure under the
DBDH assumption and D-linear assumption.
Lemma 7. The probability difference for a PPT adversary A to win the game G
and game G0 is negligible under the DBDH assumption, that is | Pr[ε]−Pr[ε0 ] | ≤
ǫDBDH .
Proof. We build a distinguisher D to play the DBDH game. Given a challenge
of [g, g a , g b , g c , Z], D distinguishes whether Z is e(g, g)abc or a random element
in GT . The details are as follows:
∗
∗
∗
For Init, A commites two challenge access policy P0∗ = [P0,1
, P0,2
, · · · , P0,n
]
∗
∗
∗
, · · · , P1,n
] to the D. Then D randomly selects a bit v ∈ 0, 1.
and P1∗ = [P1,1
, P1,2
R

Next, for Setup, D randomly chooses ω ←
− Zp , sets g1 = g ω , g2 = g b and
a
y
Y = e(g1 , g2 ) = e(g1 , g2 ) . Then the system public key is P K = hg, g1 , g2 , Y i
and sends P K to A. For Phase 1, A visit the hash oracle and key generation
oracle to get the secret key skL for attribute set L, where (L 2 P0∗ ∧L 2 P1∗ ). For
Challenge, A submits two challenge ciphertext M0 and M1 to D. Then D sets
C̃ = Mv Z ω , and the rest ciphertext components are generated in normal way.
For Phase 2, the distinguisher does as in Phase 1. For Guess, A output a bit
v ′ . If v = v ′ , D outputs 1, otherwise D outputs 0. In case 1, Z = e(g, g)abc and
C̃ = Mv Z ω = Mv Y c . The view of A in this case is distributed exactly as A′ s
view in G. We have Pr[D(g, g a , g b , g c , e(g, g)abc )] = Pr[ε]. In case 2, Z is a random
element in GT where Z = g z . The view of A in this case is distributed exactly as
A′ s view in G0 . We have Pr[D(g, g a , g b , g c , g z )] = Pr[ε0 ]. So | Pr[ε] − Pr[ε0 ] | =
| Pr[D(g, g a , g b , g c , e(g, g)abc )] − Pr[D(g, g a , g b , g c , g z )] | ≤ ǫDBDH .
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Lemma 8. The probability difference for a PPT adversary A to win the game
Gl−1 and game Gl is negligible under the D-Linear assumption, that is | Pr[εl−1 ]−
Pr[εl ] | ≤ ǫDL for 1 ≤ l ≤ lmax .
Proof. We build a distinguisher Dl to play the D-Linear game. Given a challenge
of [g, g z1 , g z2 , Z, g z2 z4 , g z3 +z4 ], Dl distinguishes whether Z is g z1 z3 or a random
element in GT . From Theorem 1, the ciphertext components {Cil ,tl ,∆ , Cil ,tl ,0 ,
Ĉil ,tl ,0 } generated normally in Gl−1 are replaced by a random element from G
∗
∗
in game Gl . In general, suppose that (νil ,tl ∈
/ P0,i
∧ νil ,tl ∈ P1,i
). The details
l
l
are as follows:
∗
∗
∗
For Init, A commits two challenge access policy P0∗ = [P0,1
, P0,2
, · · · , P0,n
]
∗
∗
∗
∗
and P1 = [P1,1 , P1,2 , · · · , P1,n ] to the Dl . Then Dl randomly selects a bit v ∈ 0, 1.
R

Next, for Setup, Dl sets g1 = g z1 , g2 = g z2 , randomly selects y ←
− Zp and sets
Y = e(g1 , g1 )y . Then the system public key is P K = hg, g1 , g2 , Y i and sends
P K to A. For Phase 1, A visit the hash oracle and key generation oracle to get
the secret key skL for attribute set L. For Challenge, A submits two challenge
ciphertext M0 and M1 to D. If (L 2 P0∗ ∧ L 2 P1∗ ), C̃ is a random element in
GT . Otherwise, Dl sets C̃ = Mv Y s , where s = z3 + s = z4 . Then Dl randomly
′′
′
′
R
selects s′ ←
− Zp and sets C∆ = Y s , Cˆ0 = g1s , C1 = g z2 z4 = g2s , Cˆ1 = Z =
′′

s′ H(m)

R

g z1 z3 = g1s−s , Cx = g2
, where s′′ = z4 . Then Dl selects {σi,∆ , σi,0 , σi,1 ←
−
Qn
Qn
Qn
G|1 ≤ i ≤ n} such that i=1 σi,∆ = i=1 σi,0 = i=1 σi,1 = 1G , and computes
the ciphertext component {{Ci,t,∆ , Ci,t,0 , Ĉi,t,0 }1≤t≤ni }1≤i≤n in Gl is the same
as in Gl−1 exception the coponents {Cil ,tl ,∆ , Cil ,tl ,0 , Ĉil ,tl ,0 }. Here Cil ,tl ,∆ =
′
σil ,∆ g s τil ,tl , Cil ,tl ,0 = σil ,0 (g z2 z4 )ail ,tl and Ĉil ,tl ,0 = σil ,1 Z bil ,tl . If Z = g z1 z3 , A
is in game Gl−1 , otherwise A is in game Gl . For Phase 2, the distinguisher does
as in Phase 1. For Guess, A output a bit v ′ . If v = v ′ , Dl outputs 1, otherwise Dl
outputs 0. In case 1, when Z = g z1 z3 , the view of A is distributed exactly as A′ s
view in Gl−1 . We have Pr[D(g, g z1 , g z2 , g z1 z3 , g z2 z4 , g z3 +z4 )] = Pr[εl−1 ]. In case 2,
Z is a random element in GT , the view of A is distributed exactly as A′ s view in
Gl . We have Pr[D(g, g z1 , g z2 , g z , g z2 z4 , g z3 +z4 )] = Pr[εl ]. So | Pr[εl−1 ] − Pr[εl ] | =
| Pr[D(g, g z1 , g z2 , g z1 z3 , g z2 z4 , g z3 +z4 )−Pr[D(g, g z1 , g z2 , g z , g z2 z4 , g z3 +z4 )] | ≤ ǫDL .
Theorem 9. Our Multi-user searchable encryption scheme is L-semantically secure against the adaptive attacks under the assumptions that DDH assumption
holds in G, F and Fp are secure PRFs and smABE is a CPA secure encryption.
Proof. This proof is similar to [Sun et al. 2016]. The main difference contains two
aspects. First, we use our smABE to encrypt the document identifiers id instead
of CP-ABE. Since the smABE is IND-sCP-CPA secure, an adversary cannot
distinguish whether a ciphertext is for the desired id or an arbitrary message.
Second, in our scheme, the simulator also needs to construct mt and D∆,0 . It is
easy to construct D∆,0 with the information of skmat . To construct mt, we use a
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Table 1: Comparison Between Two Schemes
Schemes
Access Policy Protection
Encryption Cost
Match Cost
Communication Cost
Decryption Cost

Sun et al.’s scheme
No
|T | + |GT | + (2k + 1)|G|
|DB(w̄)| · [ |T |+
|GT | + (2k + 1)|G| ]
l |DB(w̄)| · [ (2k + 1)P + hE ]

Our Proposed Scheme
Yes
2|GT | + (3η + 4)|G|
2µP
l |DB(w̄)| · [ |GT | + 4|G| ]
l |DB(w̄)| · 4P

random oracle to generate the auxiliary message m such that to keep consistent
with the SMSE.Setup algorithm. Therefore, our proposed SMSE scheme is also
L-semantically secure against the adaptive attacks.
5.2

Comparison

In this section, we compare the proposed scheme with Sun et al. scheme. Table
1 presents the comparison between these two schemes. We denote E as an exponentiation operation in GT , P as a computation operation of a paring, |T | as
the size of the access policy tree T , k as the number of attributes in the T , h as
the number of non-leaf node in T , |DB(w̄)| as the search results for the queried
keywords w̄, |G| as the bit-length of an element in group G, l as the ratio of the
number of search results for the queried keywords to the number of ones which
can be decrypted by the user.
5.3

Performance Evaluation

In this section, we provide the experimental evaluation of the proposed SMSE
scheme. Our experiments are implemented with the pairing-based cryptography
(PBC) library and OpenSSL open-source library on a LINUX machine with
Intel Core i5-6500 CPU processors running at 3.20 GHz and 16 G memory. We
evaluate the computation cost, storage cost and transmission cost between our
proposed scheme and Sun et al. scheme [Sun et al. 2016].
In the Setup algorithm, the main difference between our proposed scheme
with the scheme in [Sun et al. 2016] is the generation of the ciphertext e. In
our scheme, the ciphertext e is generated by the proposed smABE, while e in
[Sun et al. 2016] is generated by CP-ABE [Bethencourt et al. 2007]. It is first to
generate the system public key pk and the system master key mk, which are not
related to the system attribute set and the access policy in both schemes. The
size of pk and mk in the proposed smABE and CP-ABE is 764 Byte, 1020 Byte
respectively and the time cost is 0.95s, 1.23s respectively.
The search index TSet and XSet are generated by the data owner and sent to
the cloud. For each keyword, there are two elements in the TSet and one element
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Figure 3: KenGen in SMSE.

in the XSet. The difference between our SMSE scheme and Sun et al. scheme is
the generation of element e. So we implement the costs of e and the results are
shown in Figure 2. Here we set the number of attribute type from 1 to 10 and
each type has two values. The access policy in both schemes is set to the same.
The number of keyword-document pair varies from one hundred thousand to 2
million. From Figure 2a, the time cost to generate e in both schemes increases
with the number of attribute type and keyword-document pair. The time cost
in our scheme is larger than that of Sun et al. scheme. From Figure 2b, the size
of e also increases with the number of attribute type and keyword-document
pair, which in our scheme is larger than that of Sun et al. scheme. However,
the generation of e is one-time cost, and it will be outsourced to the server.
Therefore, both the time cost and storage cost in our scheme are acceptable.
The comparison of generating the attribute private key skL is shown in Figure
3. The time cost for both schemes increases with the number of attribute types,
and it is slightly larger in our scheme. For the size of attribute private key, it
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is a constant number in our scheme. However, it increases with the number of
attribute types in Sun et al. scheme. In multi-user searchable encryption setting,
the attribute private key needs to be transmitted to the different users, so the
communication cost is saved in our proposed scheme.
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Figure 4: Transmission comparison.
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Figure 5: Efficiency comparison.

The comparison of the cost of transmitting the search results is shown in
Figure 4. Here we set the number of search results is 5 thousands. For Sun et
al. scheme, all the search results are needed to be transmitted to the user, no
matter whether they can be decrypted. Besides, the size of ciphertext increases
with the number of attribute types. For our proposed scheme, it just returns
the ciphertext which can be decrypted by the user. Furthermore, the size of
ciphertext is constant. From Figure 4, we can see the size of ciphertext in our
scheme decreases with the decryption probability decreases and not increases
with the number of attribute types. As a result, the transmission cost in our
scheme is dramatically saved.
The comparison of the cost of decrypting the search results is shown in Figure
5. For Sun et al. scheme, the user needs to decrypt all the search results. In fact,
it takes a little time to find out the ones which cannot be decrypted. However, the
decryption cost for the ones which can be decrypted increases with the number of
attribute types. However, in our scheme, the user just needs to decrypt the ones
which is returned by the server. Besides, the decryption overhead is constant.
As shown in Fig. 5, our decryption algorithm is very efficient.

6

Conclusion

In this paper, we proposed a new multi-user searchable encryption scheme that
simultaneously achieves Boolean query and fast decryption. In our construction,
a server-side match technique is proposed which can ensure the cloud server to
test whether an encrypted data match the user’s decryption ability. Furthermore,
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we construct a new SMSE scheme with fast decryption based on the above technique. That is, the server can filter the search results which cannot be decrypted
by the user. Formal security analysis and performance evaluation present that
the proposed construction can achieve the desired goals and reduce the communication and decryption cost.
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